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5 The Growth of Agricultural 
Protection 
Joachim Zietz and Alberto Valdts 
Agricultural protectionism in industrialized countries is well known to heavily 
burden consumers and/or taxpayers. But it also reaches far beyond a country’s 
borders. It negatively affects actual or potential agricultural exporters. Among 
them are industrialized countries such as Canada, Australia, and New Zea- 
land, but also numerous developing countries, including some of the poorest. 
Since agriculture is the sector of comparative advantage for many developing 
countries, now and for some time in the future, agricultural protection does 
materially impair their potential for economic growth (ValdCs and Zietz 1980; 
Valdts 1987; Goldin and Knudsen 1990). 
Agricultural protection is not only important quantitatively, in the sense of 
imposing heavy costs on developing countries as well as on consumers and 
taxpayers in industrialized countries. Agricultural protection also has signifi- 
cant qualitative effects. Because agriculture is hardly under any of the disci- 
plines of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), it is the cause 
of continual trade friction among the major industrialized countries. It has 
also been at the heart of many of the problems encountered in international 
trade negotiations under the aegis of the GATT. Overall, agriculture has 
helped discredit the GATT process and may yet prevent true progress in open- 
ing up international trade (Zietz and Vald&s 1988). 
Finally, agricultural protection is not confined to the old industrialized 
countries. On the contrary, it appears to spread to developing countries in the 
process of industrialization. Korea and Taiwan are two prominent examples. 
The two countries have experienced a dynamic growth of agricultural protec- 
tion that is unprecedented in history, thus providing them with protection lev- 
els not unlike those of Japan or the European Community (EC). 
Joachim Zietz is professor of economics at Middle Tennessee State University. Alberto Valdes 
is an economist with the World Bank. 
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The determinants of agricultural protection and its growth over time have 
been investigated in previous studies. Among the contributions are Anderson 
(1983), the papers in Anderson, Hayami, et al. (1986), Anderson and Tyers 
(1989), Krueger, Schiff, and ValdCs (KSV) (1988), and Lindert (1991). Most 
of these studies, however, are conducted at a fairly high level of aggregation.' 
By contrast, this paper's perspective is somewhat more disaggregate in nature. 
This allows one to address more readily such important issues as the commod- 
ity composition of protection, the type of protective measures being used, and 
the intrinsic dynamics of agricultural protection. A more detailed understand- 
ing of how agricultural protection develops, in turn, permits one to provide 
more specific predictions of the future course of protection and to suggest 
ways to halt or slow its growth. 
The paper is organized as follows. To provide a framework for the subse- 
quent discussion, the first section surveys the pattern and extent of agricultural 
protection in East Asia relative to other industrialized countries. The follow- 
ing section identifies the rationale for the observed pattern of agricultural pro- 
tection and its growth over time. The concluding sections supply both some 
predictions of how agricultural protection may spread to other developing 
countries and some ways to contain its spread. 
5.1 The Pattern of Agricultural Protection in East Asia Compared to 
Other Industrialized Countries 
Table 5.1-5.3 provide some detail on the extent of protection for some im- 
portant traded agricultural commodities in East Asian countries and other in- 
dustrialized countries. Table 5.1 uses producer subsidy equivalents (PSEs) as 
the method to measure the level of support to producers. PSEs have become a 
popular measurement instrument at least since the publication of the OECD 
(1987) report on agricultural policies in industrialized countries. PSEs include 
direct assistance to farmers via border measures that keep the domestic pro- 
ducer price above the import price and nonborder government assistance fi- 
nanced through the budget, such as input subsidies. For the EC and East Asia, 
border measures are the major cause behind the high PSEs.* For most, al- 
though not all, agricultural commodities in the United States, subsidies and 
direct payments to farmers are the dominant form of as~is tance.~ Hence, in 
general, it is the taxpayer who finances the support to farmers in the United 
States, whereas it is the consumer who does the same in other countries. The 
trade effect of a particular PSE figure can differ depending on what makes up 
the PSE (Zietz and ValdCs 1988). Even if this were not the case, the PSE still 
1. An exception is KSV (1988), which is also unique in putting into perspective the relative 
importance in terms of incentives to farmers of direct sectoral (agricultural) protection and the 
indirect effects resulting from economy-wide policies, such as overvalued exchange rates. 
2. The PSEs are therefore close in value to the nominal rates of protection. 
3.  PSEs can therefore diverge significantly from nominal rates of protection. 
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Table 5.1 Average Producer Subsidy Equivalents for Major Commodities, 
1982-87 
Wheat Rice sugar Beef 
Australia 6.1 11.2 13.8 6 
Canada 36.2 31.1 10.3 
EC 31 41.5 32.8 43.5 
New Zealand 12 
U.S. 40.1 46.5 68.4 9 
Japan 99.1 89.4 69.7 61.9 
South Korea 14.0 64.4 
Taiwan 65.9 31.4 43.4 18.5 
Source: Webb, Lopez, and Penn (1990) 
provides only the support level provided to producers. If one is interested in 
measuring the trade effect of government assistance, one has to look also at 
the consumer subsidy equivalents (CSEs). CSEs tend to be negative for most 
countries with positive PSEs and with border measures making up the bulk of 
the PSEs. Consumers are, in other words, taxed by agricultural support mea- 
sures and, therefore, consume less than in the absence of agricultural support 
measures. As a consequence, imports are lower. 
In Korea and Japan, protection for the major food staples such as rice is 
mainly rationalized, at least officially, with food security arguments, an objec- 
tive for which border measures are not optimal in the sense of minimizing the 
associated welfare 10sses.~ Assuming that the governments are not acting ir- 
rationally, there appears to be a need for explaining this particular choice of 
intervention. In this context, a natural ancillary question is to what extent the 
motivation for protection in East Asia is different from that for the European 
Community (EC). The EC’s main objective for protecting the agricultural sec- 
tor is, quite openly, to achieve income parity for its farmers. Again, border 
measures do not provide the welfare-maximizing tool to achieve this objec- 
tive. Hence, the question for choosing border measures also arises with regard 
to the EC. The discussion in the following section will also try to shed some 
light on this choice. 
As demonstrated in table 5.1, support levels in Korea and Taiwan have 
surpassed those in the EC and are closing in on those in Japan. This is quite 
remarkable given that producers of agricultural products were still taxed in the 
early 1960s. This unusually fast shift from taxing agriculture to protecting it 
has been the subject of several studies (Anderson, Hayami, et al. 1986). A 
question that arises in this context is whether the East Asian experience with 
4. This is an optimal tool of intervention only if self-sufficiency (reduction in or elimination of 
imports) is desired. To simply achieve food security or income parity, more efficient measures are 
available. For a discussion of border measures from the perspective of GATT, see Snape (1987). 
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agricultural protection is an exception or whether one could expect other de- 
veloping countries on the verge of industrialization to follow suit. Needless to 
say, the latter would have significant implications for world agricultural mar- 
kets. This point will be explored in some detail in the following sections. 
It is well documented that protection in industrialized countries extends to 
product groups other than the major staples of table 5.1. Fruit and vegetables, 
that is, higher-value agricultural products similar to beef, are also heavily pro- 
tected (Islam 1988). Japan has some of the highest tariff levels among indus- 
trialized countries for these products. For most countries, there exists a signif- 
icant degree of tariff escalation for this product category. Products are less 
heavily protected when they are fresh compared to when they are processed. 
Nontariff barriers (NTBs), such as discretionary import licensing procedures 
as well as sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, tend to be widespread for 
these product groups. They materially restrict trade, especially for developing 
countries without the legal expertise and political power to cut through the 
bureaucratic maze associated with these measures. 
Table 5.2 provides some more detail on the import regime for agricultural 
products for East Asian countries. One observes that both South Korea and 
Taiwan follow the pattern of Japan rather closely: high tariffs on the major 
staples and on high-value products combined with restrictive import licens- 
ing, customs clearance, and sanitary regulations. The NTBs in these three 
East Asian countries appear to be particularly effective in restricting trade, 
even with other industrialized countries (U.S. Trade Representative 1991). 
What makes these NTBs so effective is the fact that they are often adminis- 
tered by lower-level bureaucrats with significant discretionary power to inter- 
pret rules and guidelines that are intentionally left rather vague. 
5.2 Agriculture’s Response to a Loss of Comparative Advantage 
5.2.1 The Loss of Agricultural Comparative Advantage 
The point of departure for our discussion is a structural change of the econ- 
omy of the type that occurs during the development process. For a low-income 
agriculture-based country, such a structural change is typically the emergence 
of a rapidly growing manufacturing sector. This development is of interest for 
the discussion of agricultural protection insofar as industrial earnings tend to 
jump ahead of those in agriculture. The resulting sectoral income disparity, in 
turn, increases the opportunity cost of traditional farming and, hence, even- 
tually eliminates its comparative advantage. 
The economic reasons for a loss in comparative advantage can be found on 
both the input and the output side of the agricultural production p r o c e s ~ . ~  On
5. A common way to think of agriculture’s loss in comparative advantage is in terms of an 
appreciation of the real sectoral (agricultural) exchange rate. 
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Table 5.2 Import Protection for Agricultural Products in East Asia 
Country Protective Measure 
Japan A 
B. 
C. 
South Korea A 
B. 
Taiwan 
C. 
A .  
B. 
C .  
D. 
High tariffs on agricultural products relative to industrial products (12.1 
vs. 2 percent) 
Extensive quantitative import restrictions on cereals (ban on rice imports); 
planned phasing out of quotas on beef and oranges 
Restrictive phytosanitary restrictions on fresh fruit and vegetables 
High tariffs (up to 50 percent) on high-value agricultural products such as 
fresh fruit, nuts, juices, and processed foods 
Restrictive import licensing regime for agricultural products (none for in- 
dustrial products) covering, among others, rice (effective import ban), 
beef (effective import ban from 1985 to 1989), feed grains, soybeans, and 
fruit and vegetables; beef liberalization in progress 
Slow and arbitrary customs clearance procedures, including excessive and 
discretionary phytosanitary regulations 
High tariffs on agricultural products relative to industrial products (23.2 
vs. 9.7 percent) in 1989 
Very high tariffs (40-50 percent) on high-value agricultural products such 
as fresh fruit and processed foods 
Strict import licenses for most agricultural products, with effective bans 
on wheat flour, chicken, and peanuts 
Restrictive phytosanitary standards and testing requirements for meats, 
fruit juices, and other products 
~ 
Source: U.S. Trade Representative (1991). 
the input side, rising unit production costs are to blame. They have their origin 
in two developments. First, urban migration and wage competition with in- 
dustry tend to raise rural wages above the rate of productivity growth in the 
traditional agricultural sector. Second, industrial inputs, such as farm machin- 
ery or fertilizer, rise in price if a policy of import substitution is followed for 
the industrial sector. On the output side, the reasons for a lower income 
growth rate in agriculture relative to industry can be found in (i) a changing 
demand pattern and (ii) the indirect effects of general trade and macroeco- 
nomic policies that affect the exchange rate. 
There are a number of reasons for demand to shift away over time from 
traditional agricultural products or agricultural products in general. One im- 
portant reason for a relative decline in demand derives from Engel’s law.6 
Products with an inelastic income elasticity will experience less sales growth 
than products with an income elasticity above unity. Hence, their share in total 
product will decline in a closed economy that grows over time. Ceteris pari- 
bus, the relative decline in demand will deteriorate the internal product or 
sectoral terms of trade, raise the opportunity cost of production, and, hence, 
lower or possibly eliminate any existing comparative advantage. 
6 .  Other reasons for changing demand patterns clearly exist, e.g., changing preferences. But 
we will abstract from them at this point to streamline the discussion. 
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An overvalued exchange rate, as caused, e.g., by a fixed nominal exchange 
rate combined with domestic inflation, can have a similar effect. It tends to 
lower the border price of agricultural tradables and, therefore, depresses the 
demand for domestically produced commodities, hurting the producers of 
both exportables and import-competing products. Industrialization through a 
policy of import substitution has the similar effect of implicitly taxing exports 
and subsidizing imports. The economics of these effects has recently been 
subjected to a thorough investigation for agricultural products, particularly in 
KSV (1988), Schiff and Valdes (1992), and several studies at the International 
Food Policy Research Institute (see, e.g., Dorosh and ValdCs 1990; Mundlak, 
Cavallo, and Domenech 1989; Bautista 1987; and Garcia 1981). 
5.2.2 Responses Other than Protection to a Loss 
in Comparative Advantage 
In the process of losing its comparative advantage, traditional agriculture is 
put under pressure to adjust, that is, to identify ways to avoid the negative 
income effects that accompany a loss in comparative advantage. Protection, 
or, more generally, government support programs, is clearly one way to avoid 
these income effects. However, there may be alternative viable responses. 
Take first the loss in comparative advantage that results from a relative de- 
cline in revenue. To simplify the discussion, let us assume that farmers can do 
little to materially affect overall macroeconomic or trade policies and thus 
eliminate the pressure on revenue that may originate from this side. Low in- 
come elasticities for traditional staple food products such as cereals’ are then 
the main reason for declining product or sectoral terms of trade. To escape 
their consequences, productivity can be raised. This may be done by switch- 
ing to large-scale production and/or the adoption of input-saving production 
technologies. Alternatively, farmers can switch to agricultural products with 
high income elasticities of demand. Products that fit into this category include 
such high-value commodities as beef and veal; other livestock, such as poultry 
and pork (nonruminant meats); fresh fruit and vegetables; processed foods, 
such as preserved fruit and vegetables, jams and jellies, and fruit juices; and, 
last but not least, items that satisfy the demand for healthier products, such as 
biologically grown foods. The common theme is to move from homogeneous 
commodities that are sold under conditions of perfect competition into prod- 
uct groups with a high value-added content, for which product innovation, 
differentiation, and identification allow for some degree of imperfect compe- 
tition. 
The latter has been a quantitatively important response in East Asia. The 
share of gross value of cereals in agricultural production has declined by one- 
third or more in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan since the 1950s. During the same 
time, the share in agricultural production of livestock (in particular nonrumi- 
7. Compare, e.g., the collection of elasticity estimates in Carter and Gardiner (1988). 
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nant meats) and fruit and vegetables has doubled or tripled (Anderson 1986, 
12). This move toward high-value products with high income elasticities, 
however, can avoid the need for government assistance only as long as ade- 
quate resource endowments exist for the latter products. For beef and veal, 
for example, which are classic high-value high-elasticity commodities, 
this means the availability of cheap feed, either in the form of extensive 
pasturelands or low prices for feed grains. An alternative to beef production 
for countries endowed with little land is the production of nonruminant meats, 
that is, pork and poultry. These livestock products offer income elasticities 
similar to that of beef without the need for extensive grazing land. This 
is why a country like Thailand, with a very low pasture per capita figure 
(see table 5.4 below), can be a very significant and competitive exporter of 
nonruminant meats. It may also explain why Korea and Taiwan, both with 
similarly low pasture per capita levels, have relatively low support levels for 
pork. 
If rising unit costs endanger comparative advantage, an increase in produc- 
tivity is a vital response. Eventually, as wages continue to rise disproportion- 
ately in industry, rising unit costs are of concern also in the production of 
high-value products. This will happen the sooner the more labor intensive 
their production is. Many horticultural products fit into this category. It is 
interesting to note in this context that much of the fruit and vegetable produc- 
tion in the United States depends for its competitiveness on cheap migrant 
labor that is hired on a seasonal basis. The absence of cheap labor in addition 
to high land prices may explain the considerable protection afforded to high- 
value fruits documented for Japan, Korea, and Taiwan in table 5.2. 
From the discussion above it follows that, in the long run, sufficient produc- 
tivity growth and/or low labor costs are essential to avoid a loss in compara- 
tive advantage for agriculture. Whether sufficient productivity growth can be 
achieved depends on a number of variables. A very important one is the re- 
source base of the country. A few examples will illustrate the role of the re- 
source base in this context. 
Raising productivity sufficiently may be difficult to achieve for countries 
with little arable land relative to the population size. Better production tech- 
nology alone is certainly insufficient for staple food products such as cereals 
because these products will likely remain very land intensive regardless of any 
foreseeable improvement in production technology. The key to productivity 
increases, in particular for staple foods, would therefore appear to rest on the 
ability to make use of economies of scale in production. This in turn requires 
sufficient land resources. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate the implications of this 
simple idea with some numbers on the endowments of countries with agricul- 
tural land. Table 5.3 refers to industrialized countries and table 5.4 to devel- 
oping and newly industrialized countries. Both tables rank the included coun- 
tries by two criteria: (i) hectares of permanent pastureland per one thousand 
inhabitants and (ii) hectares of arable and permanent cropland per one thou- 
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Table 5.3 Industrialized Countries’ Endowment of Land Useable for 
Agriculture 
Permanent Pastures 
(in hectares) per 
Country 1,000 Inhabitants 
Australia 
New Zealand 
USSR 
Ireland 
Canada 
United States 
Greece 
Yugoslavia 
Spain 
Austria 
Switzerland 
Bulgaria 
France 
United Kingdom 
Romania 
Hungary 
Poland 
Czechoslovakia 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Germany, East 
Germany 
Germany, West 
BelgiudLuxemburg 
Sweden 
Portugal 
Denmark 
Israel 
Finland 
Norway 
Japan 
EC- 12 
26,939.9 
4,337.8 
1,343.1 
1,335.1 
1,230.2 
1,009.1 
530.8 
275.1 
267.4 
261.3 
247.5 
228.7 
221.1 
203.6 
193.7 
176.4 
117.5 
109.4 
105.9 
87.2 
77.7 
75.0 
74.9 
74.9 
69.7 
68.1 
52.0 
42.3 
37.8 
26.9 
23.6 
5.1 
Arable and Permanent 
Cropland (in hectares) 
Country per 1,000 Inhabitants 
Australia 2,994.3 
Canada 1,826.6 
USSR 833.5 
United States 793.6 
Spain 530.3 
Denmark 502.7 
Finland 491.8 
Romania 467.9 
Bulgaria 464.2 
Poland 399.1 
Greece 398.0 
Sweden 355.2 
France 343.0 
Yugoslavia 336.8 
Czechoslovakia 332.5 
Germany, East 297.8 
Ireland 294.9 
Portugal 270.6 
EC- 12 245.3 
Norway 204.3 
Austria 200.7 
Germany 159.9 
New Zealand 159.7 
United Kingdom 124.6 
Germany, West 122.2 
Israel 102.4 
BelgiudLuxemburg 79.7 
Switzerland 63.4 
Netherlands 61.5 
Hungary 499.3 
Italy 212.1 
Japan 39.4 
Source; Calculated from information given in U.S. Department of Agriculture (1990). 
sand inhabitants.8 A high value for the first criterion can be interpreted as 
being indicative of a comparative advantage in ruminant meat production. 
This is borne out by the fact that, of the six countries with values in excess of 
one thousand in table 5.3, five are net exporters of ruminant meat, with the 
one exception being the former Soviet Union. In addition, four of the coun- 
8. Arable land includes mainly land under temporary crops, whereas permanent cropland refers 
to land that is not planted after each harvest (e.g., fruit, rubber, and other trees) (see U.S. Depart- 
ment of Agriculture 1990). 
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Table 5.4 Endowment of Land Useable for Agriculture: Developing Countries 
and Newly Industralized Countries 
Permanent Pastures 
(in hectares) per 
Country 1 ,OOO Inhabitants 
Somalia 
Zambia 
Argentina 
Uruguay 
Paraguay 
Bolivia 
Madagascar 
Mozambique 
Sudan 
South Africa 
Tanzania 
Peru 
Niger 
Algeria 
Colombia 
Burkina Faso 
Brazil 
Chile 
Ethiopia 
Venezuela 
Morocco 
Mexico 
Iran 
Senegal 
Cameroon 
Syria 
Panama 
Zimbabwe 
Ecuador 
Zaire 
Guinea 
Tunisia 
Uganda 
Dominican Republic 
China 
Ivory Coast 
Ghana 
Malawi 
Iraq 
Nigeria 
Kenya 
Turkey 
Guatemala 
Nepal 
Haiti 
Indonesia 
(continued) 
5,342.6 
5,223.9 
4,678.7 
4,521.7 
4,498.8 
4,195.3 
3,188.4 
2,557.1 
2,511.7 
1,576.6 
1,458.1 
1,445.3 
1,391.9 
1,265.8 
1,224.2 
1,095.0 
1,067.4 
1,008.7 
954.3 
945.4 
934.2 
863.6 
813.7 
793.1 
590.9 
578.1 
521.7 
490.2 
483.9 
426.8 
335.6 
326.9 
306.7 
297.0 
269.3 
262.9 
254.8 
210.2 
183.3 
177.3 
168.8 
116.4 
84.4 
73.1 
3,333.3 
1,440.2 
Arable and Permanent 
Cropland (in hectares) 
Country per 1 ,OOO Inhabitants 
Argentina 
Senegal 
Zambia 
Tunisia 
Cameroon 
Sudan 
Brazil 
Niger 
Turkey 
Paraguay 
Bolivia 
Syria 
Uganda 
Uruguay 
South Africa 
Burkina Faso 
Thailand 
Morocco 
Chile 
Ivory Coast 
Iraq 
Algeria 
Malawi 
Ethiopia 
Zimbabwe 
Iran 
Mexico 
Malaysia 
Nigeria 
Madagascar 
Ecuador 
Burma 
Panama 
Zaire 
Tanzania 
Dominican Republic 
Guatemala 
Mozambique 
Ghana 
India 
Venezuela 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Somalia 
Colombia 
Rwanda 
1,182.0 
791.7 
774.3 
693.4 
681.9 
569.8 
559.0 
551.6 
548.4 
544.0 
539.8 
535.5 
443.0 
442.0 
406.5 
384.2 
383.9 
383.7 
359.0 
354.5 
347.1 
343.0 
339.4 
329.3 
325.5 
314.9 
313.5 
312.8 
311.8 
298.0 
276.1 
272.8 
258.2 
254.9 
233.8 
229.7 
229.4 
223.9 
222.0 
220.9 
217.9 
214.2 
198.7 
189.8 
185.9 
184.5 
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Permanent Pastures 
(in hectares) per 
Country 1,000 Inhabitants 
'Ramble 5.4 (continued) 
Arable and Permanent 
Cropland (in hectares) 
Country per 1,000 Inhabitants 
Rwanda 70.0 
Pakistan 52.0 
Sr i  Lanka 27.8 
Taiwan 21.9 
Philippines 21.2 
India 15.6 
Thailand 14.1 
Burma 9.8 
Bangladesh 6.0 
Vietnam 5.2 
South Korea I .9 
Malaysia I .7 
Egypt .o 
Haiti 153.4 
Philippines 144.4 
Nepal 136.4 
Indonesia 128.7 
Sri Lanka 118.7 
Guinea 116.9 
Kenya 116.2 
Vietnam 111.6 
China 93.6 
Bangladesh 90.8 
South Korea 52.2 
Egypt 51.3 
Taiwan 45.8 
tries are reported with low PSE values in table 5.1, which suggests that their 
export performance is not the result of government intervention. It is also 
interesting to see Japan at the very bottom of the list of countries in table 5.3. 
Again, this corresponds well with the very high PSE values in table 5.1. The 
second criterion used in tables 5.3 and 5.4, arable land per capita, is intended 
to show that countries with high values are likely to be able to produce and 
export cereals or other land-intensive crops competitively. It comes as no sur- 
prise that the countries with large, sparsely populated land masses, such as 
the United States, Canada, and Australia, tend to be net exporters of cereals. 
Again, Japan is at the bottom of the list, with PSE levels on cereals that are 
far in excess of those of other industrialized countries. The message of table 
5.4 is fairly similar to that of table 5.3. Argentina, an important exporter of 
both ruminant meat (beef) and cereals, is very close to the top of the list of 
countries, suggesting a strong comparative advantage, whereas Korea and 
Taiwan are close to the bottom. 
One may note in this context that a large land endowment is certainly not 
sufficient for a country to be a competitive exporter of meats or  cereal^.^ Other 
factors can reduce or eliminate the advantage of a large land endowment. Ex- 
amples are ill-defined property rights or heavy taxation of the agricultural sec- 
tor. The latter factors largely explain why countries such as the former Soviet 
Union and Romania are net importers of cereals despite their favorable land 
endowments. 
9. The EC, e.g., is an exporter of beef only because of very high levels of government assist- 
ance (table 5.1) and very low costs for feed grain substitutes (soybeans, cassava, etc.). 
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To the extent that productivity cannot be increased sufficiently and cheap 
labor is not available, two choices remain to farmers to avoid the negative 
income effects associated with a loss in comparative advantage. They can 
(i) raise their off-farm labor supply or (ii) invest in political activity with the 
objective to obtain government help through either input subsidies or higher 
output prices. Which route is taken depends ultimately on the perceived cost- 
benefit ratios associated with each option. 
Sufficient nonfarm employment opportunities within reach of the rural 
household can prevent negative income effects when comparative advantage 
declines. Nonfarm employment has certainly been a significant factor for East 
Asian farmers. As reported by Anderson (1986, 13), the share of income from 
nonfarm sources has risen for Japanese farm households from 49 percent in 
the early 1960s to more than 80 percent in the early 1980~.~O An even stronger 
increase has been observed for Taiwan, with the share going from 34 to 74 
percent. Lagging somewhat behind in this respect is Korea, with the share 
moving from 20 to 35 percent. The main reason for the slower pace of change 
in Korea is likely the slow growth of off-farm employment opportunities in 
rural areas compared to Taiwan and Japan (Otsuka 1989)." The continued 
relatively strong dependence of farm households on farm income in Korea 
clearly raises their exposure to negative income effects. One would expect this 
to lead, ceteris paribus, to a relatively strong preference for the last option to 
avoid negative income effects: lobbying for government assistance. The fig- 
ures in table 5.1 appear to support this view. Comparing the PSEs for Korea 
and Taiwan, two countries of a similar level of development, Korea has indeed 
significantly higher government support levels than Taiwan. 
5.2.3 Protection as an Alternative Response to a Loss of 
Comparative Advantage 
A DemandlSupply Framework of the Political Market for 
Government Assistance 
For farmers in East Asia, Europe, and, partly, the United States, govern- 
ment support through subsidies and/or import protection has been an impor- 
tant way to minimize income reductions resulting from a loss in comparative 
advantage. For example, general equilibrium calculations by Vincent (1 989) 
for Korea show that protection has raised farm incomes more than 40 percent 
in real terms for producers of cereals, about 20 percent for producers of other 
crops, and 12 percent for livestock producers. The success of farmers in East 
10. This, combined with high government support levels, has managed to make farmers one of 
the most well-off segments of the population (Otsuka 1989, 442). 
1 1 .  Anecdotal evidence also supports the importance of off-farm employment opportunities in 
much of Europe. The demand for protection appears to be strongest in regions with little or no 
industry. Many of these regions tend to be mountainous, with high production costs and little 
scope for achieving economies of scale. 
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Asia and the EC in securing government assistance stands in strong contrast 
to the implicit taxation that farmers in many developing countries are sub- 
jected to (KSV 1988). Some straightforward political economy considerations 
may help explain why farmers differ in their ability to obtain government as- 
sistance (including import protection). 
Downs’s (1957) neoclassical economic theory of politics provides a simple 
starting point.’* The model allows one to think of protection as the result of 
demand and supply forces. Downs’s model assumes that politicians adopt pol- 
icies that maximize their chances of staying in office. The beneficiaries of a 
particular policy, such as government assistance, invest in lobbying effort up 
to the point where an additional investment of resources is expected to have 
no net benefits (Baldwin 1982). The expected losers of a particular policy also 
invest in lobbying effort, similarly balancing marginal cost and expected mar- 
ginal benefit. One can think of the beneficiaries of government assistance as 
on the demand side for protection, whereas politicians are on the supply side. 
Politicians supply protection up to the point where the marginal cost of lost 
support from those opposing government assistance or protection is just equal 
to the marginal gain in support from those groups demanding assistance or 
protection. 
The emphasis of Downs’s model on marginal changes clearly entails one 
problem: it is ill equipped to deal with large changes, such as major structural 
shifts or regime switches. In those instances, political coalitions tend to break 
down or are realigned, and formal models based on marginal changes can 
therefore predict little. However, the loss of comparative advantage in agricul- 
ture tends to occur gradually rather than at distinct points in time. Hence, 
sufficient political stability may be maintained, at least in principle, even 
though not in each case, for Downs’s model to remain a useful framework for 
thinking about the growth of agricultural protection. 
The Determinants of Demand 
From the earlier discussion it followed that the basic demand of farmers for 
protection or, more generally, government intervention results from the high 
cost, relative to investing in political lobbying, of avoiding income losses 
through (i) raising productivity growth, (ii) diversifying into products with 
high income elasticities, or (iii) more off-farm employment. According to 
Downs’s theory and Olson’s (1965) work, the demand for protection gains 
political clout with a decline in group size and the consequent cost of organi- 
zation. The empirical work by Honma and Hayami (1986) and Honma (in this 
volume) has provided support for this hypothesis for agriculture. As agricul- 
ture shrinks in the development process, the demand for protection becomes 
more effective ceteris paribus, reaches a maximum, and eventually declines 
again as the size of the agricultural sector shrinks under a critical level. In 
12. Downs’s theory is also at the heart of numerous previous studies, including Anderson, 
Hayami, and Honma (1986) and Anderson and Tyers (1989). 
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addition to smaller group size, there are other changes taking place as employ- 
ment shrinks in agriculture that help organize a farming lobby and that raise 
the demand for government support. Education levels rise, and, as informa- 
tion and transportation become more easily accessible, better and lower-cost 
communication links are established with the city centers. The lower cost of 
information, in turn, allows the rural sector to identify more quickly and more 
reliably any emerging income disparity in relation to other groups in the coun- 
try. It also reduces the cost of becoming informed and taking part in and or- 
ganizing political activity. In addition, as agriculture becomes more commer- 
cialized, agricultural support services establish themselves in the rural 
sector.13 These too can be counted on investing lobbying effort that is directed 
at the survival of the farming sector. 
The Determinants of Supply 
The supply of protection depends on (i) the perceived costs of protection to 
individuals or groups inside or outside the sector and (ii) the power of the 
bureaucracy that is charged with overseeing the particular sector demanding 
protection. The latter point is of particular importance for agriculture. Agri- 
culture is one of the few sectors that has managed in most countries to estab- 
lish a separate ministerial bureaucracy for itself. These bureaucracies tend to 
be massive and powerful in most industrialized countries, with a keen under- 
standing that additional government programs for their clientele, the farmers, 
translate into job security and added prestige (Messerlin 1981). l4 
High perceived costs of protection are likely to generate resistance or coun- 
tervailing power. For politicians, this is equivalent to a rise in their supply 
curve of protection. Higher bribes are required from the sector seeking protec- 
tion, while less protection is provided at the same time. One can identify a 
number of factors that tend to shift the supply curve for agricultural protection 
or support. 
1. An agricultural sector that is large relative to other sectors tends to raise 
the supply curve for agricultural support measures, in particular income trans- 
fers. To provide support to agriculture under this scenario, politicians would 
have to impose heavy costs on the sectors outside agriculture. Hence, as long 
as agriculture dominates the economy, protection or government support is 
quite unlikely. There are exceptions, however, for example, if a country hap- 
pens to be an oil exporter. Oil revenue can be used to subsidize agriculture 
even if it is still large in size. This has been done, for example, in Indonesia 
starting in the 1970s (Barichello 1989). 
2 .  As income increases, food items take up an increasingly smaller budget 
13. These range from the agricultural machine industry, transportation, banking, insurance, and 
marketing services to research and development facilities specializing in agriculture. 
14. An agricultural bureaucracy is often established early on in the development process. Its 
first task may be to tax the agricultural sector. Later on in the development process, however, as 
the focus switches to assisting agriculture, these bureaucracies tend to grow along with the extent 
of assistance and protection granted to the sector. 
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share. This consequence of Engel’s law ensures that consumers do not have 
much of an incentive to get informed or organized to oppose agricultural pro- 
tection. The cost associated with becoming active are simply much higher 
than the expected benefits. We have a case of rational indifference. On this 
account, the supply curve of agricultural protection tends to decline over time. 
Poor consumers with a relatively large share of their budget going to food 
products should of course have more of an interest in opposing protection. 
Poor consumers, however, are generally also those with the least knowledge 
and political power. 
3. Industry resistance to agricultural protection has the potential to shift up 
the supply curve for protection. There are at least three factors that can pro- 
vide industry with a rationale to oppose agricultural protection. During the 
earlier stages of development, agricultural protection may translate into higher 
wage costs and, hence, reduced profitability.I5 As the budget share that work- 
ers have to devote to food declines over time, this factor decreases in impor- 
tance. Later on in the development process, industry’s foreign export markets 
may become jeopardized as other countries threaten to or do retaliate against 
the country’s agricultural protection. This factor has been growing in impor- 
tance recently for the East Asian countries: the United States has started to 
link, at least informally, access to the U.S. market in manufactured products 
to exporting countries’ ability to contain or reduce their level of agricultural 
protection in product groups of interest to the United States. Finally, the inter- 
national competitiveness of an export-oriented industry may be threatened by 
the currency appreciation that regularly follows a rise in protection (Clements 
and Sjaastad 1984). Clearly, either of the last two factors can operate to con- 
tain agricultural protection only if there is a sufficient degree of export orien- 
tation in industry. 
4. In the longer run, as income levels reach a certain critical level, resist- 
ance to agricultural protection may also arise out of environmental concerns 
of the public. In much of the EC, for example, intensive land utilization by 
agriculture, with its heavy emphasis on the use of environmentally damaging 
chemicals, has been associated by organized environmental groups with agri- 
cultural protection. Since environmental concerns appear to have a high in- 
come elasticity of demand as well as organized and vocal lobbying groups, 
they may eventually grow to develop into a credible countervailing power 
against the farming lobby.I6 
5. Resistance against agricultural protection may also arise from within ag- 
riculture itself. Two factors that have already been mentioned separately com- 
15. Real wage rigidity may be the result of strong trade unions, such as those common in parts 
of Latin America. 
16. However, there also appears to be the distinct possibility of environmental concerns oper- 
ating on the demand side for protection. An example would be restrictions on imports of agricul- 
tural products grown with the help of chemical agents that are known to be harmful to the environ- 
ment. 
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bine to bring this about. First, agricultural protection raises land prices, that 
is, the return to the fixed factor. Second, more land is needed by farmers to 
achieve economies of scale for such land-intensive products as cereals. In 
sum, agricultural protection actually makes it more difficult for farmers to halt 
the decline in comparative advantage. Whether this factor is sufficient to con- 
tain protection depends on the structure of the affected farms. Many small 
farms, none able to reap economies of scale with any reasonable increase in 
size, will not be able to contain protection. On the contrary, they are likely to 
demand protection. What is needed, then, are farms that already have a criti- 
cal size. 
6. A tight government budget is likely to shift upward the supply curve of 
protection. This is particularly true if agricultural protection is provided in the 
form of support prices, as for many commodities in the EC, or when govern- 
ment support of the agricultural sector is provided mainly through budgetary 
expenses, as in the United States. Resistance can then be expected by (i) tax- 
payers and (ii) the recipients of government support programs, who compete 
with agriculture for funds.” Budgetary considerations also appear to play an 
increasing role in East Asia (Moon 1989, 440). The increasing importance of 
budgetary pressures is not an accident. If an increasing number of countries 
follow a policy of agricultural support and protection, world prices become 
artificially depressed. Lower world prices, however, tend to increase, ceteris 
paribus, the budgetary cost of government support programs. Hence, ever 
higher budgetary expenditures will be necessary just to maintain the initial 
level of real support to farmers. This vicious circle has become quite signifi- 
cant during the 1980s, at least for the United States and the EC. Its importance 
can be measured by the fact that it is generally credited with being one of the 
driving forces behind the Uruguay Round and its focus on agriculture (Zietz 
and ValdCs 1988). 
7. Protection can be contained by credible pressure from outside the coun- 
try. This point has already been touched on in the context of industry resist- 
ance to agricultural protection. Outside pressure can take the form of (i) bilat- 
eral pressure applied by a powerful trading partner that is negatively affected 
by agricultural support programs or (ii) legal obligations such as those deriv- 
ing from GATT. 
If bilateral pressure is brought to bear on a country, it can arouse national 
resentment that the groups benefiting from protection may be able to capital- 
17. The fact that most developing countries tax agriculture at the beginning of their develop- 
ment process (KSV 1988) can also be interpreted, in a wider sense, as reflecting budgetary pres- 
sures. Since there are few organized activities that can be taxed, taxes would be unacceptably high 
for those that can, such as the fledgling manufacturing sector. Resistance to high taxes would be 
strong, however, because the persons involved tend to be well informed and small in number. 
Taxes on trade (in particular exports) and through marketing boards remain as alternatives with 
less political fallout because of their relatively broad base, their indirect nature, and the problems 
of the agricultural sector to organize effectively. In sum, agriculture is taxed by default at low 
levels of development as much as by design. 
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ize on in their effort to prevent or slow a policy change. This may have played 
some role, for example, in the case of the long-standing Japanese resistance 
to U. S.  demands that the Japanese market be opened up for agricultural prod- 
ucts. However, if a country stands to lose significantly in areas outside agri- 
culture, the support for continued protection that derives from growing na- 
tional resentment may not be sufficient to neutralize the internal pressure for 
moderating agricultural protection that comes from outside agriculture, 
mainly industry. The supply curve of politicians for agricultural protection 
would therefore likely shift up. This mechanism has been behind (i) Korea’s 
agreement to raise beef imports from the United States in 1988 and 1989 fol- 
lowing a complete import ban in 1985 and (ii) Korea’s acceptance of the un- 
favorable 1989 GATT panel ruling on its beef import regime (U.S. Interna- 
tional Trade Commission 1990). Another example of the effectiveness of this 
type of outside pressure in changing the outcome in the political market for 
protection is Japan’s recent agreement to phase out quotas on beef and 
oranges. 
Legal obligations under the GATT can be another effective way to stem a 
rise in protection (Hudec 1987, chap. 9). In agriculture, however, GATT has 
not been able to serve this function because of the loose discipline it puts on 
this sector. One of the primary objectives of the Uruguay Round is to change 
this. 
Decisions on the Type of Protection 
If the political market for government assistance actually leads to protec- 
tion, the question arises of how this protection is administered. What methods 
of protection are used, subsidies or border measures, and, if border measures, 
tariffs or nontariff barriers? From the discussion in the last section, it is clear 
that measures that are transparent in their protective intent, whose costs to the 
public are easily identified, and that require little manpower to administer 
cannot be the preferred tools for politicians. Measures that have to be pre- 
ferred from an economic point of view, in the sense that they minimize welfare 
losses, are likely to raise the resistance level of both the public and the agri- 
cultural bureaucracy and are therefore not preferred from a political point of 
view. For that reason, uniform tariffs may be as unacceptable to politicians as 
direct income transfers to farmers that are uncoupled from production. Mea- 
sures that require annual budget appropriations will likely fall in the same 
category. Border measures, by contrast, whether in the form of tariffs or 
NTBs, fare better on this account, in particular as long as the GATT continues 
to force little discipline on agriculture. And since the public has to be kept in 
the dark about the level and extent of protection and the agricultural bureauc- 
racy kept busy, politicians prefer more obscure border measures to more trans- 
parent ones. Hence, we tend to observe in agriculture more restrictions, such 
18. A full discussion of this issue is provided in Miner and Hathaway (1988, 1 1  1-65) 
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as variable levies, seasonal quotas, sanitary regulations, burdensome customs 
clearance procedures, and discretionary import licensing, than uniform tar- 
iffs. Obfuscation is clearly not limited to border measures but is also the lead- 
ing principle in the design of domestic agricultural support measures in most 
industrialized countries. These tend to be excessively complex, difficult for 
the public to understand, and often difficult to administer. A good recent over- 
view of the many domestic measures being applied in various countries is 
given in Webb, Lopez, and Penn (1990). 
Budget pressures and international obligations constrain the choice of pro- 
tectionist tools. The former tend to slow down the growth of government 
assistance and import protection measures with high budget outlays, in partic- 
ular support prices defended by variable import levies as in the EC or defi- 
ciency payments as in the United States. With few international constraints on 
their choice of measures, however, governments retain the option to switch to 
a less costly alternative with an equivalent effect. In agriculture, this can 
mean, for example, the increased use of health and sanitary regulations and 
standards,I9 discretionary import licensing (table 5.2) ,  voluntary export re- 
straints ( V E R S ) , ~ ~  political pressure to gain voluntary import expansions,21 or 
more exotic schemes such as the sale of surplus food tied to the sale of high- 
technology products or arms. More stringent international legal obligations 
may prevent this switch to measures with equivalent effect. However, they are 
effective only insofar as they minimize loopholes and vague rules. The latter 
are easily spotted by the protectionist lobby, and, once they are identified, 
politicians will face significant pressure to make use of them. This explains, 
in part, the rise in gray-area measures such as VERs and the tactical use of 
antidumping and countervailing duty investigations in sectors other than agri- 
culture that are subject to GATT rules. 
The Trend Growth of Protection Levels 
Once a mechanism for government assistance is in place, the question 
arises of how to set and adjust support levels over time. For example, 
government-defended support prices for staple food products are seldom kept 
at their initial level but tend to rise over time. What is the operating target that 
governments, and the agricultural lobby, use in this case to adjust the level of 
assistance? In the EC, with its elaborate system of support prices, the level of 
government assistance is set in a process that resembles the centralized annual 
wage bargaining between unions and employer associations that are typical of 
most major member countries of the European Community. Support price de- 
19. Take, for example, the EC directive on the hormone content of meats that restricted U.S.  
20. Although less prevalent in agriculture so far, VERs are by no means unknown. An example 
21. These have become a favorite tool of the United States, in particular following the passage 
exports to the EC (U.S. International Trade Commission 1990). 
is the VER the EC has negotiated with Thailand on cassava exports, a feed grain substitute. 
of the “Super-301” legislation in 1988. 
132 Joachim Zietz and Albert0 Valdes 
cisions, for example, boil down to a bargaining game between the European 
Commission and the farming lobby as represented by the national ministries 
of agriculture in the Council of Ministers.22 In this process, the level of assist- 
ance tends to get tied to wage increases outside agriculture, with income par- 
ity of farmers being the overriding concern. 
A natural question in this context is to what extent the East Asian practice 
is similar to that in the EC. Do developments in industry also drive agricul- 
tural output prices in East Asia? Figures 5.1 and 5.2 provide some graphic 
evidence for Korean rice and beef prices, respectively. Figure 5.1 reveals that 
the relation between the domestic and the world price of rice appears to have 
changed over time in Both prices move in parallel through 1968. 
Starting in 1969, however, the domestic price of rice follows a strong upward 
trend, whereas the world price rises only moderately. Yet there appears to 
remain some relation between the two, although of a different nature than 
before 1969. In particular, it is now the growth rate of the domestic price 
rather than its level that starts to move in parallel with the world price. For 
example, the world food shortage in 1973-74, with its sharp rise in world 
food prices, induces an increase in the growth rate of the domestic rice price. 
The world commodity price boom of 1980 again accelerates the growth rate 
of the domestic price; the downturn in world price in 1982 slows it down. By 
contrast, the level of the domestic rice price appears to be tracked rather 
closely by the level of industrial productivity, which, in turn, is closely asso- 
ciated with real industrial wages. 
The situation for beef prices is fairly similar (fig. 5.2). Domestic price 
equals world price through 1966. After that, the domestic price increases 
sharply relative to the world price. The year-to-year movements of the domes- 
tic price, however, follow the world price rather closely throughout the three 
decades, without the break observed for rice. By contrast, the level of indus- 
trial productivity predicts beef prices much less accurately than it does rice 
prices, although it provides the general trend for domestic beef prices. 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 suggest at least two tentative conclusions. First, gov- 
ernment price policy and hence the government’s decisions on protective mea- 
sures can differ among commodities, a point that has also been forcefully 
made by KSV (1988) and Schiff and Valdks ( 1992).24 Second, Korean experi- 
ence suggests that agricultural policymakers in East Asia tie their level of 
agricultural assistance to productivity growth in industry, an outcome that is 
fairly close to that of the agricultural protection game in the EC. This supports 
the general conclusion derived in earlier, more formal work that the history of 
22. Petit (1985) provides a detailed discussion of the political economy of decision making on 
23. The figure depicts the price for a traditional variety of rice. 
24. KSV (1988) and Schiff and Valdes (1992) mainly differentiate between agricultural export- 
ables that tend to be heavily taxed, through direct and indirect methods, and imported food prod- 
ucts that are generally protected. 
agricultural issues in the EC and the United States. 
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agricultural protection in East Asian countries is similar to that observed else- 
where (Honma and Hayami 1986; Honma, in this volume). East Asia is not a 
special case. What appears to be certain from figures 5.1 and 5.2 is that the 
changes in nominal protection coefficients or producer subsidy equivalents, 
which are the focus of international attention, are not the focal point of do- 
mestic policy decisions. Rather, these measures of protection follow as a re- 
sidual from the interplay of domestic decisions on import protection and the 
changing conditions on the world market. 
5.3 The Future of Agricultural Protection 
5.3.1 Some General Trends 
Where will the forces of demand and supply carry agricultural protection in 
the future? In some of the major industrialized countries, in particular the 
United States and the EC, budget pressures appear to have reached a critical 
point, forcing governments to engage in negotiations aimed at limiting at least 
a further growth in agricultural protection. This does not yet apply to many 
developing countries that are on the verge of industrialization. One can there- 
fore not exclude the possibility that such rapidly industrializing countries as 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia or such energy-exporting countries as 
Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen may repeat the Korean and Tai- 
wanese experience with agricultural protection. To provide some feeling for 
the likelihood of this development, we will try to identify some general ten- 
dencies of government behavior toward agriculture. 
A particular agricultural commodity will likely receive different treatment 
in the following three groups of countries: (i) importers with little import- 
competing production, such as Egypt for cereals; (ii) importers with a sizable 
import-competing sector, such as Korea for rice; and (iii) actual or potential 
exporters, such as Argentina for cereals. Countries in the first group are un- 
likely to introduce significant protection. The import-competing sector will be 
below the critical size to lobby effectively relative to other special interest 
groups. This is quite different for the second group of countries. Hence, cet- 
eris paribus, we are very likely to see a significant growth of protection for 
this group. The third group, which consists of countries with a comparative 
advantage in the particular agricultural product, will be unlikely to introduce 
protective measures. The main issue for these countries is rather the removal 
of export taxes. In Latin America, agricultural interests appear to have gained 
sufficient strength in the 1980s to slowly eliminate the taxation of agricultural 
export able^.^^ A similar observation holds for Thailand. The long-standing 
25. Export taxes have traditionally been a very important source of government revenue in 
many Latin American countries. Their removal and substitution by other taxes has raised difficult 
technical as well as political economy problems. 
135 The Growth of Agricultural Protection 
tax on rice exports was finally eliminated in 1986. However, there is also an 
opposing trend. Export taxes on agricultural raw materials, such as coffee 
beans and oranges, are a way to induce the domestic production of high-value 
processed products, such as soluble coffee and orange juice. Export taxes on 
the inputs used in the food-processing industry may therefore become more 
popular in the future. To ensure the success of the processing industry, the 
export tax on inputs may be combined with “infant industry” protection of the 
output. A recent example of this is provided by Indonesia (Barichello 1989). 
Table 5.5 provides some evidence for other Asian countries. 
5.3.2 A Geographic Breakdown 
From a geographic perspective, Asia appears to be the region with the most 
significant potential for agricultural protection. Most countries in this region 
have relatively little agricultural land relative to the size of the population. In 
addition, many countries have significant domestic production levels for 
staples, in particular rice and coarse grains. Recent evidence provided by 
KSV (1988), for example, suggests a growing trend in direct protection for 
these agricultural importables in such countries as Malaysia and the Philip- 
pines. Similar developments are under way in Indonesia (Barichello 1989). 
The experience of the latter country is particularly interesting because agricul- 
tural protection has gained momentum at a much lower per capita income 
level than in Taiwan or Korea. This has been made possible by the inflow of 
oil export revenue in the 1970s. Table 5.5 provides some background on the 
Table 5.5 Import Protection for Agricultural Products in Several Asian and 
African Countries 
Country Protective Measures 
~~~ ~ 
Thailand A. High tariffs (60 percent and more) on high-value agricultural products 
such as fresh fruit, beef, and processed foods 
B.  Restrictive import registration and licensing procedures 
A. High tariffs (30-50 percent) on high-value agricultural products such as 
B. Sales tax serving as discriminatory excess import surcharge 
A. High tariffs (50 percent and more) on high-value agricultural products 
B. High tariffs (20 percent) on meat imports, strict import licensing for beef 
C. Restrictive state trading practices in rice and feed grains 
A. High tariffs up to 50 percent 
B. State trading for wheat and soybeans, effective import ban for rice 
A. Import bans on wheat, rice, maize, vegetable oils, and other products 
B. High tariffs on certain coarse grains ( I 0 0  percent) 
Malaysia 
fresh fruit, juices, and processed foods 
Philippines 
such as fresh fruit and processed foods 
and pork 
Indonesia 
Nigeria 
~ 
Source: U.S. Trade Representative (1991). 
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type and level of agricultural protection found in the Asian countries discussed 
above. 
On the basis of table 5.4, a number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa have 
a likely comparative advantage in ruminant meat production. Exports of these 
products are indeed quite important for Somalia, Mali, and Botswana, to 
name just three. The region is a large exporter of tropical beverages, fibers, 
and sugar. Yet the level of implicit and explicit export taxes tends to be high 
(Schiff and ValdCs 1992). One would expect that there will be a growing ten- 
dency in the future for the protection of processed products, such as those 
derived from coffee or cocoa beans. Export taxes on the raw products may 
remain in place to further nurture the development of an indigenous process- 
ing industry. To counteract the implicit import subsidy provided by exchange 
rate overvaluation, some countries, for example, Ghana, have erected very 
high import barriers for import-competing products, in particular basic 
staples, such as rice (KSV 1988). Nigeria, the most populous country in the 
region, also falls into this category (table 5.5). As an oil exporter, it appears 
to follow policies that are similar to those of another oil exporter, Indonesia. 
The countries in North Africa and the Middle East are net importers of 
cereals, many with low self-sufficiency ratios. Protection is therefore rela- 
tively unlikely except for those countries with significant domestic produc- 
tion, such as Morocco and Syria, or oil exporters. Saudi Arabia, for example, 
has used a heavy dose of protection and has spent vast sums to produce cereals 
domestically. By the end of the 1980s, these policies had managed to more 
than double its self-sufficiency ratio (58 percent) compared to 1970. Other oil 
exporters in the region may follow this pattern, especially in the aftermath of 
the Gulf War and the trade embargo imposed on Iraq. Yemen, for example, 
appears to be well on its way. Since numerous countries in the region have the 
potential for the production of fruit and vegetables, one may also see protec- 
tion evolve for these products, in both their fresh and their processed forms. 
Latin American countries have recently made great strides toward liberal- 
izing their trade regimes. Following the example of Chile, most have dis- 
carded import licensing and quantitative restrictions or are in the process of 
doing so (table 5.6). Differences among countries appear to result mainly 
from the speed with which they are adopting a system of tariffs only (tariffi- 
cation) or are reducing tariff levels within that system. The ongoing push for 
trade liberalization should help remove the remaining trade bias, allowing the 
countries to take full advantage of their export potential. Exports are likely to 
grow in most products, including those that are land intensive. Land does not 
appear to be a constraining factor for many Latin American countries (table 
5.4). So there is scope for production under economies of scale similar to that 
in Australia and other large agricultural producers. Anecdotal evidence sug- 
gests that there is already a growing tendency toward increasingly large agri- 
cultural production units that are managed much like a business firm. This 
represents somewhat of a reversal from earlier times, when large, inefficiently 
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Table 5.6 Import Protection for Agricultural Products in Several Latin 
American Countries 
Country Protective Measures 
Argentina A. 
B. 
Brazil A. 
B. 
Chile A. 
Colombia A. 
B. 
Mexico A. 
B. 
Three-tiered tariff structure with 0, 11, and 22 percent, respectively 
Phasing out of import licensing in 1991 
Tariff rates between 0 and 40 percent by 1994, with average tariff rate of 
20 percent 
Automatic import licensing within five days 
I 1  percent uniform tariff rates, some specific tariffs left 
Tariffs of 0-50 percent, additional surcharges of around 10 percent on 
wheat imports; by 1994 tariffs targeted to be between 0 and 15 percent 
Import licensing phased out in 1991 
Maximum tariff rates of 20 percent, with a trade-weighted average of 10 
percent 
Import licensing left for 6 percent of tariff categories, mainly agricultural 
products, including cereals and fruit 
Source: U.S. Trade Representative (1991) and information obtained from countries 
managed estates were split up into smaller units. A point other than econo- 
mies of scale that works against agricultural protection in Latin America is the 
virtual absence compared to Europe and Asia of farming establishments in 
remote disadvantaged regions. The farmers in these regions appear to have a 
more than proportionate influence on the formulation of agricultural policies 
in Asia and Europe. 
5.4 Containing the Spread of Agricultural Protection 
The discussion presented above suggests that a continuation of current 
trends is likely to raise agricultural protection among developing countries 
that are on the verge of industrialization, especially in Asia. If this is to be 
avoided, the protectionist forces have to be checked. Three main approaches 
appear promising in this respect. 
First, governments of developing countries have to be induced early on in 
the development process to prepare for structural adjustment. Policies have to 
be devised that moderate the negative income effects that result from a loss in 
comparative advantage for agricultural products. In this way, demands for pro- 
tection may not come up or may be moderated. Among the possible adjust- 
ment policies are (i) efforts to raise off-farm employment opportunities in ru- 
ral areas26 and (ii) incentives for farmers to switch to high-value products that 
use less of the scarce factor (e.g., land or labor). To be successful, these poli- 
cies require an accompanying set of appropriate policy instruments. Chief 
26. One may note that raising off-farm employment has a dual purpose. Not only can it reduce 
the demand for protection, but it is also a cornerstone of a policy aimed at alleviating rural poverty. 
For this latter point, see Johnson et al. (1991). 
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among those would be better primary education in rural areas, improved infra- 
structure, support for research and development, and extension  service^.^' 
Second, on the basis of the recent Latin American experience and, in partic- 
ular, the Chilean experience, it appears that a policy change to tariffs only 
(tariffication) can be a powerful way to contain the forces of protection. The 
strength of the tariffication system lies in its transparency. It makes it difficult 
for special interest groups to obtain special treatment without other groups in 
society noticing or fully understanding the extent of that special treatment. 
Tariffication is clearly most powerful in constraining protectionist demands 
when it is coupled with a commitment to uniformity in tariffs. In fact, a quasi- 
constitutional commitment to uniform tariffs can provide politicians with a 
shield against protectionist demands that is similar to that envisioned by the 
GATT. The Chilean experience of the last decade has shown this point quite 
forcefully. However, to change from a system with no constraints on the type 
and extent of protectionist policies to one of uniform tariffs is unlikely to be 
easy. From the Latin American experience, it appears that such a switch in 
policy is easier to achieve if a country has gone through an economic crisis 
that has lasted long enough or was deep enough to thoroughly discredit the 
old economic system and to sufficiently weaken the established special inter- 
est groups. To be successful, the reform process also has to be credible. A 
new political leadership that is unburdened by the policies of the past and the 
example of other countries being successful with economic policy reform may 
help induce such credibility. The timing of the reform process may also be of 
importance in this context. In particular, a swift change in the policy regime 
may induce more credibility in the commitment to the reform process than a 
slow reform pace. A quick change may also take better advantage of any tem- 
porary disorganization of special interest groups. A slow change, by contrast, 
could allow protectionist forces sufficient time to reorganize and eventually 
bring the whole reform process to a halt. 
Third, the forces potentially opposing agricultural protection have to be 
strengthened. Outside pressure through the GATT appears to be a promising 
way to achieve this objective. However, there are two important precondi- 
tions: (i) agriculture has to be fully incorporated in the GATT; (ii) the GATT 
disciplines have to be extended to developing countries.28 
The first point implies that there must not be different trade rules governing 
different sectors. No sector must be able to claim special treatment. This ap- 
plies to agriculture as well as to textiles and clothing and services. Without 
equal treatment of sectors, GATT cannot inspire much confidence. After all, 
why should an exporter of agricultural products have to export under differ- 
27. Many of the same policy instruments have also been recommended to alleviate rural poverty 
28. A more detailed discussion of these and similar points is contained in Zietz and Valdes 
(Johnson et al. 1991). 
(1988). A generalization can be found in Zietz (1989). 
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ent rules than an exporter of chemicals? A corollary is that the large industria- 
lized countries have to give up (i) exempting sectors from GATT disciplines 
once they lose their comparative advantage in them (agriculture, apparel) 
and (ii) demanding at the same time new disciplines for those sectors that their 
comparative advantage is moving to (high-tech industries and services). In 
other words, industrialized countries cannot be summarily exempted from the 
need for structural adjustment, while this is demanded from developing coun- 
tries. 
Extending the GATT disciplines to developing countries essentially means 
discontinuing the rules on special and differential treatment (S&D). S&D 
has exempted developing countries from any meaningful GATT disciplines 
(Hudec 1987). The GATT has, therefore, been unable to fulfill one of its most 
important objectives for developing countries, that is, to serve politicians as a 
shield against domestic demands for protection. From the perspective of the 
GATT and its survival as a guarantor of free trade, S&D treatment is likely to 
be counterproductive in the future. Developing countries are moving rapidly 
into areas such as light industries and heavy manufacturing and areas where 
intellectual property rights play a major role. Exempting them from the disci- 
plines that apply to industrialized countries in these areas erodes and eventu- 
ally destroys the credibility of GATT as an institution. The growth of bilateral 
pressure tactics on the part of industrialized countries, such as “Super-301”- 
type arrangements, is the likely result in the short run. Full-fledged managed 
trade would loom in the longer run. This would spell the end of GATT and of 
a multilateral trading system based on the principle of comparative advantage. 
Developing countries can be expected to be the biggest losers under such an 
arrangement. 
To bring about the suggested changes is a most difficult task. However, the 
Uruguay Round has offered the best hope as of now to move in the right direc- 
tion. The basic reason is that developing countries have, for the first time, 
some substantive offers to make to industrialized countries in the negotiations. 
This allows them, in principle, to take part in the negotiations as true negoti- 
ators and not just as observers. This was not the case in prior rounds. Devel- 
oping countries could be found only on the request side of negotiations. As a 
consequence, they could not take part in any substantive negotiations and so 
concentrated on S&D instead. To take full advantage of the different role of 
developing countries, however, some changes are required in the way GATT 
negotiations are taking place. 
Since countries are at different levels of development at any given point in 
time, successful GATT negotiations require cross-sectoral deals. Balanced 
give and take within sectoral boundaries is impossible to achieve for the set of 
all countries. Insisting on this older GATT negotiating scheme means restrict- 
ing meaningful negotiations to take place only among countries at the same 
stage of development or concentration of their main economic activity. In 
practice, that implies negotiations between Europe, the United States, and 
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Japan. It is impossible to balance the offers and requests of all potential partic- 
ipants by sector. Table 5.7 provides an illustration of this for the case of agri- 
culture. A possible balancing of offers and requests within agriculture is theo- 
retically possible if an entry other than a question mark appears for each 
country or group of countries. This is the case only for the United States and 
the EC.29 All other parties approach the negotiations only from one side or not 
at all. Hence, there is little substance that they can contribute to the negotia- 
tions if the negotiations are conducted on the traditional sector basis. Mean- 
ingful requests and offers are possible between all participants if cross- 
sectoral agreements are allowed. That way, requests of the three major blocks 
of industrialized countries for new GATT agreements on services, trade- 
related investment measurements (TRIMS), and trade-related intellectual 
property rights (TRIPS) can be balanced by the requests of the Cairns group 
members, newly industrialized countries (NICs), and other developing coun- 
tries for liberalization in agriculture, textiles, and apparel (MFA), as well as 
more discipline in the use of voluntary export restraints (VERs), countervail- 
ing duties (CVDs), and antidumping measures (ADS). It remains to be seen to 
what extent these opportunities can be exploited in the future. 
5.5 Summary and Conclusions 
The paper has investigated the determinants of agricultural protection and 
its growth over time, as it relates to developing countries in general and the 
newly industrialized countries of East Asia in particular. One conclusion is 
that a loss of comparative advantage in agriculture can be prevented only if 
productivity growth in agriculture matches that in industry. For most agricul- 
tural products, however, productivity growth ultimately hinges on sufficient 
endowments with arable land and cheap labor, a condition not met by the 
newly industrialized countries of East Asia. In the absence of adequate factor 
endowments, farmers can avoid income losses relative to industry only if they 
are able to engage in off-farm employment or if they lobby for protection. 
The demand for protection tends to grow strongly as the farming sector 
shrinks in size, education levels rise, and information costs decline. The sup- 
ply of protection by politicians rises as the farming sector declines in size and 
income levels rise. Factors that can potentially limit the supply of agricultural 
protection are (i) resistance by industry, (ii) environmental concerns, (iii) a 
tight government budget, and (iv) international obligations coupled with cred- 
ible enforcement mechanisms. 
The objective of agricultural protection in East Asia appears to be very 
similar to that of the European Community and other industrialized countries. 
29. The entry “harmonize” in table 5.7 means that the United States allows the EC to remove 
the zero tariff binding on feed grain substitutes, while at the same time EC protection levels on 
grains are reduced somewhat. 
141 The Growth of Agricultural Protection 
~ 
Table 5.7 Potential Offers and Requests for Agriculture 
U.S. EC Japan Cairns NICs Importers 
Offer harmonize liberalize liberalize ? liberalize ? 
Request liberalize harmonize ? liberalize ? ? 
Note: Cairns stands for the members of the Cairns group, which are nonsubsidizing food export- 
ers; NICs represents those food-importing newly industralized countries that are not part of the 
Cairns group, e.g., Korea and Taiwan. Importers denotes developing country net food importers 
such as Egypt. The offers and requests are potential, not actual. A question mark denotes the 
absence of a meaningful offer or request, even potentially. 
The emphasis is on maintaining income parity with industry. The methods that 
are employed to achieve this objective can be predicted from a simple demand 
and supply framework of protection. They tend to be border measures, often 
of an obscure nature and difficult to understand or to predict. 
The paper suggests that many Asian countries that are on the verge of in- 
dustrialization have considerable potential for agricultural protection because 
most of them have a significant amount of domestic production but lack the 
natural comparative advantage in agriculture that is typical of many Latin 
American countries. To contain a further spread of agricultural protection, 
more emphasis has to be put on off-farm employment in rural sectors and firm 
GATT disciplines that apply to agriculture in developed and developing coun- 
tries alike. 
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Comment Masayoshi Honma 
Joachim Zietz and Alberto Valdks presented us a good summary of a general 
framework in which to  consider the growth of agricultural protection in indus- 
trializing economies. They derived meaningful implications of such agricul- 
tural protectionism for developing countries and for the current GATT system. 
Their insight into the process of the political market is useful for sharpening 
our understanding of the disarray into which world agricultural policies have 
fallen today. Since their approach to agricultural protectionism is based on the 
same framework as my approach in Honma (in this volume), I found nothing 
with which to disagree regarding the substance of their paper. My remarks, 
therefore, will be complimentary and serve mainly to open discussion. 
As Zietz and ValdCs have shown, the pattern of agricultural protection in 
the world as revealed by cross-country and longitudinal observations lends 
Masayoshi Honma is professor of economics at Otaru University of Commerce, Hokkaido, 
Japan. 
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itself readily to an explanation in terms of political market factors. The polit- 
ical market approach is an attempt to explain why government interventions 
are persistent and not likely to cease despite the fact that they are economi- 
cally less efficient and usually lead to high-cost solutions to stated objectives. 
The solution in the political market is not economically efficient. Therefore, 
an analysis of the political market explains the discrepancy between political 
and economic solutions. 
Zietz and ValdCs neatly summarize the development of agricultural protec- 
tionism in international comparisons, and they explain the pattern of agricul- 
tural protection that follows changes in the political environment as an econ- 
omy develops. As they indicated, the high level of agricultural protection in 
industrial countries is at a political equilibrium with the high demand for and 
high supply of protection policies. Therefore, there is less incentive to change 
this political equilibrium domestically. One way to break down this equilib- 
rium is to introduce another player into the political market, which is foreign 
pressure. Foreign pressure comes from foreign producers, not consumers, so 
that foreign pressure becomes a strong countervailing force working against 
the domestic demand for protection. The recent removal of import quotas for 
beef and oranges in Japan is a good example of the importance of foreign 
pressure in determining a country’s level of protection. In other words, polit- 
ical markets are now internationally linked, and we need to analyze a new 
equilibrium of the political market in an international setting. 
In a consideration of the political equilibrium at a high level of agricultural 
protection domestically, it is important to indicate that such an equilibrium is 
sustained by the asymmetry of information on the costs and benefits of agri- 
cultural protection. The benefits are well recognized by farmers, who, there- 
fore, can calculate the benefits when they demand protection. However, the 
costs of protection are generally vague and not so visible. Politicians always 
prefer more obscure measures of protection. The indication by Zietz and 
ValdCs that protection measures tend to be well hidden and less straight- 
forward, for example, nontariff barriers (NTBs), is very important. Therefore, 
another step toward breaking down the persistent political equilibrium of pro- 
tection is to make the costs of protection visible to the general public. For 
example, the calculations of producer subsidy equivalents (PSEs) by the 
OECD are appreciated to take into account costs of agricultural protection 
whether they are used in multilateral negotiations or not. 
In calculating the costs of protection, not only the costs burdening consum- 
ers and taxpayers but also the cost of political lobbying should be considered. 
In order to influence politicians, interest groups invest in lobbying, but the 
outcome is not economically productive. Lobbying activities clearly absorb 
scarce resources, and the social value of these resources should be counted in 
the total welfare costs as well as the conventional deadweight loss arising 
from government intervention. If the cost of rent-seeking activities becomes 
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large, it seriously disturbs economic development and delays the takeoff of 
developing economies. 
Following the use of foreign pressure and more information on the real cost 
of protection, the third factor to break through the stalemate of protectionism 
is reorienting policy measures to support farmers. The root of agricultural 
protection is the rural-urban income disparity, or “negative income effects,” in 
Zietz and Valdes’s terms, in the process of economic development. As they 
mention, there are four ways for farmers to escape from the income disparity 
problem. First is to increase agricultural productivity. Second is diversifying 
production toward more income-elastic products. Third is raising off-farm la- 
bor supply. And fourth is lobbying for protection. Farmers generally choose 
lobbying to avoid the income gap because the other ways are more costly. 
Therefore, a desirable policy to eliminate the income gap encourages farmers 
to use methods other than lobbying, which is not efficient in the macroeco- 
nomic sense. Government assistance in developing new technologies for 
higher productivity, providing better market information and demand analyses 
for farmers’ production diversification, and offering job training to improve 
both job opportunities and job skills are all effective ways to reduce the cost 
of farmers’ attempts to avoid negative income effects. These government ser- 
vices strongly resemble public goods and may be acceptable to the general 
public as a way of supporting farmers. And those who lag seriously behind in 
income earnings because, for example, there is little job opportunity in their 
area should be supported by direct payments from a social security program- 
support that comes not because they are farmers but because they are poor. 
In other words, agricultural policy should be reoriented toward so-called de- 
coupling. Assisting or supporting agriculture itself is not a bad policy, but the 
means of assistance is the problem. 
The concept of “decoupling” should also be applied to the treatment of 
developing countries in the GATT system. Zietz and Vald&s discuss the spe- 
cial and differential treatment of developing countries in section 5.4, which is 
the most important part of their paper. They propose that, ideally, special and 
differential treatment should be phased out altogether. They also state that it 
has done little good to developing countries but a lot of harm to the GATT 
process. I agree on both points. Developing countries should not be exempted 
from the GATT disciplines for the same reason that agriculture should not be 
exempted. Any exemptions erode and jeopardize the credibility of the GATT 
as an institution. If agriculture should be incorporated fully into the 
GATT, why not incorporate developing countries fully into the GATT? The 
GATT disciplines should be applied without exemptions regardless of sector 
or country. If some assistance is needed, it should be directed toward that need 
in the most efficient way. For example, assistance for development should 
come from official development aid or some other direct means rather than 
through interventions or special and differential treatment in trade. Even ex- 
146 Joachim Zietz and Albert0 Valdes 
emption from the GATT disciplines for balance-of-payments reasons should 
be eliminated. This exemption appears to play a role in increasing import 
restrictions in developing countries. If a country faces a difficulty in its inter- 
national balance of payments, it should be financed directly through the IMF 
on behalf of the GATT. Better yet, the GATT itself should have such a financ- 
ing function to serve countries that have temporary difficulties in international 
balance of payments. In other words, collaborations between the GATT and 
the IMF that differ from those under the current system are required. These 
strict applications of the GATT principles are essential if the growth of the 
world economy through international trade is to be maintained. I hope that the 
current negotiations of the Uruguay Round will be successful in this regard. 
